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A characteristic marker of impulsive decision making is the discounting of delayed rewards, demonstrated via choice preferences and
choice-related brain activity. However, delay discountingmay also arise fromhow subjective reward value is dynamically represented in
the brain when anticipating an upcoming chosen reward. In the current study, brain activity was continuously monitored as human
participants freely selected an immediate or delayed primary liquid reward and then waited for the specified delay before consuming it.
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) exhibited a characteristic pattern of activity dynamics during the delay period, as well as
modulation during choice, that is consistent with the time-discounted coding of subjective value. The ventral striatum (VS) exhibited a
similar activity pattern, but preferentially in impulsive individuals. A contrasting profile of delay-related and choice activation was
observed in the anterior PFC (aPFC), but selectively in patient individuals. Functional connectivity analyses indicated that both vmPFC
and aPFC exerted modulatory, but opposite, influences on VS activation. These results link behavioral impulsivity and self-control to
dynamically evolving neural representations of future reward value, not just during choice, but also during postchoice delay periods.
Introduction
Intertemporal decisionmaking requires evaluation of future out-
comes that vary both in their magnitude and time of delivery. A
reliable finding is that individuals discount the value of rewards
that are delayed in time (Mischel et al., 1989; Frederic et al., 2002;
Ainslie, 2005). This phenomenon, known as delay discounting,
also exhibits substantial individual differences, reflecting a criti-
cal aspect of behavioral impulsivity (Madden and Bickel, 2009;
Peters and Bu¨chel, 2011). While impulsivity is characterized by
steep discounting of delayed rewards, and/or overvaluation of
immediate rewards (IRs) (Kirby et al., 1999; Kable andGlimcher,
2007), patience may arise from self-control processes that bias
attention toward, and/or enhance the valuation of delayed re-
wards (McClure et al., 2004; Luo et al., 2009; Figner et al., 2010).
Prior studies of intertemporal decisionmaking have identified
brain regions associated with the time-discounted coding of sub-
jective value (SV), such as ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and ventral striatum (VS), but have focused exclusively
on activation occurring at the time of choice (for review, see
Montague et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2010; Peters and Bu¨chel,
2010a). In contrast, the examination of postchoice neural activity
has been neglected, although the choice of a delayed reward is, by
definition, always followed by a waiting period. This may be be-
cause previous work has used hypothetical rewards and/or delay
timescales that were not amenable to examination in a controlled
manner. The current study directly addresses these limitations by
using a decision-making paradigm for primary rewards that were
delivered and consumed after an experienced, unfilled delay in-
terval of 30–60 s (Jimura et al., 2009, 2011) (see Figs. 1A,B). A
key goal of this study was to monitor the dynamics of delay-
related activation unconfounded by residual decision-related ac-
tivity (cf. Berns et al., 2006; McClure et al., 2007).
An important reason for examining postdecision brain activ-
ity is that the subjective value of a future rewardmight be contin-
uously estimated during this delay interval. Specifically, it seems
likely that subjective value is represented in a temporally evolving
manner, with value estimates increasing in a nonlinear fashion as
the time to reward delivery decreases (Montague and Berns,
2002; Green andMyerson, 2004; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008;
Rangel et al., 2008). Additionally, the postdecision period may
engage a distinct dynamic valuation component related to antic-
ipation of the chosen reward. In particular, some economicmod-
els postulate that anticipation of a future reward itself confers
current utility (Loewenstein, 1987; Berns et al., 2006). This com-
ponent, known as anticipatory utility (AU), entails complemen-
tary characteristics to the time-discounted goal value, because of
the intertemporal trade-off between them (Loewenstein, 1987).
The examination of postdecision neural activity dynamics
provides an important opportunity to explore how impulsivity
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and self-control are related to the dynamic representation of reward
value. Specifically, the patience needed to select delayed over imme-
diate rewards might be associated with the representations of antic-
ipatory utility during the postdecision period, which become more
prominent in patient individuals. Conversely, impulsivity in deci-
sion making might be reflected in a steeper rise of reward valuation
while awaiting future chosen rewards.
Materials andMethods
Human participants performed an intertemporal decision-making task
that, in previous behavioral studies, we have demonstrated evokes a ro-
bust and stable form of delay discounting across short timescales (i.e.,
10–60 s) (Jimura et al., 2009, 2011). We used this paradigm in conjunc-
tion with fMRI to focus on individual differences in delay discounting
and associated brain activity dynamics, testing whether impulsivity and
self-control are reflected in the evolving pattern of subjective value rep-
resentation occurring during the window between choice and reward
delivery.
Participants. Participants (N 43; mean age, 23.0 years; range, 18–35
years; 20male, 23 female) were right handed and free from any history of
psychiatric or neurological disorders. Each participant provided written
informed consent after additional screening for physical or medical con-
dition affecting eligibility for fMRI. The study protocol was approved in
accordance with guidelines instituted by theWashingtonUniversity Hu-
manResearch ProtectionOffice. Participantswere compensated for their
participation ($10 per hour for the behavioral session, $25per hour for
the fMRI session). Of the 45 participants recruited into the study, two
were eliminated due to the small number of
choices (10) for the delayed option in the
fMRI session. No participants who partici-
pated in our previous experiments (Jimura et
al., 2009, 2011) were recruited.
Apparatus. E-Prime programs (Psychology
Software Tools) controlled the behavioral task
as well as the delivery of liquid rewards via a
syringe pump (SP210iw; World Precision In-
struments). Liquids from two 60 ml plastic sy-
ringesmounted on the pumpweremerged into
one tube and then delivered to the participant’s
mouth through a plastic tube. The simultane-
ous use of two syringes allowed for a comfort-
able flow rate of 2.0 ml/s. The reward was
delivered in 0.4 ml squirts but was experienced
as a continuous flow. The amount of reward a
participant received in a given trial was deter-
mined by the number of squirts.
Behavioral procedure. The experiment con-
sisted of two sessions (behavioral and fMRI)
administered on separate days. In both of the
sessions, participants were instructed not to
drink any liquid for 4 h before the experiment.
The behavioral session provided an estimate of
each participant’s delay-discounting rate. Pre-
vious work demonstrated that discounting be-
havior in this task is stable across sessions
(Jimura et al., 2011). The results of the behav-
ioral session were used for characterization of
individual differences and optimization of the
amount of immediate reward in the fMRI ses-
sion (see fMRI session procedure, below). Be-
fore the experiment, participants were asked to
choose one favorite drink that would serve as
the reward from a list consisting of apple, or-
ange, grape, grapefruit, and cranberry juices,
lemonade, and water. No participants re-
quested to change the reward drink in the fMRI
session.
Behavioral task. In both of the behavioral
and fMRI sessions, participants performed the
intertemporal decision-making task that we developed previously (Fig.
1A,B) (Jimura et al., 2009, 2011). At the beginning of each trial, two
alternatives were presented at left and right locations on the screen: one
involving a larger amount reward (20 or 40 squirts) available after a delay
(10, 30, or 60 s) and a variable smaller amount available immediately.
Participants were instructed to press one of two corresponding response
buttons to indicate their preference. If the smaller, immediate amount
was chosen, then a message appeared on the screen indicating that re-
ward delivery could now begin. If the delayed reward was chosen, the
participant had to wait to receive the reward. The choice period lasted
from the onset of the choice presentation until participants’ response,
with the delay period starting immediately after the response. During the
delay, a fixation cross was presented on the center of the screen. The
background color of the screen was blue while the remaining time was
30–60 s, and red while remaining time 0–30 s. This was aimed to mini-
mize the error of time estimation of reward outcome in the long delay
condition.
At the timeof rewarddelivery,participants sawavisualmessage indicating
the rewardwas ready. Importantly, participants were able to control the rate
of liquid flow. Reward delivery continued as long as the button was held
down; if thebuttonwasreleased,deliverypausedandthenresumedwhenthe
buttonwaspressedagain.During rewarddelivery, theamount remaining (in
squirts)wasdisplayedbelowaredhorizontalbarwhose lengthcorresponded
to the number of squirts still available. After the participant finished drink-
ing, a fixation cross was presented.
Task trials had a constant onset asynchrony of 150 s independent of
participants’ choices. This procedure was implemented to prevent par-
Figure 1. Behavioral paradigm. A, Participants made a choice between larger amount of liquid available after seconds and
smaller amount of liquid available immediately.B, In each trial, participantswaited for thedelay indicated aftermaking adecision,
and then drank the liquid before the next trial. The procedure was identical in the behavioral and fMRI sessions. C, Model-based
value representation of future reward during the delay period. The subjective valuemodel (orange) represents a gradual increase
from the start of the delay toward reward outcome, whereas the anticipatory utility (blue) models an inverse pattern, a gradual
decrease. The dotted and solid lines indicate economic and BOLD convolution models, respectively.
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ticipants from selecting a strategy of repeatedly choosing the immediate
option to maximize the reward attained per unit time (Fig. 1B). Because
of this constant onset asynchrony, the optimal strategy to maximize re-
ward rate is to always choose the delayed option. The duration of each
trial thus varied, depending on participants’ choice and the length of the
delay period, from24 to84 s. Then, a variable intertrial interval (ITI)
occurred, comprising both fixation and distractor task periods distrib-
uted across the ITI. The distractor tasks were included to minimize the
effects of previous decisions, i.e., encouraging the treatment of each trial
as a “one-shot” decision. Specifically, each task trial was followed by four
pseudorandomized distractor trials, two trials of a Sternberg-type work-
ing memory task (Jimura et al., 2010, 2011) and two trials of a second
delay-discounting task using hypothetical monetary rewards (Jimura et
al., 2011). To inform participants of the type of task to be performed on
the upcoming trial, a cue (i.e., “MONEY,” “JUICE,” or “MEMORY”)was
presented for 2 s before each trial. Data from these distractor trials, con-
cerning the relationship between working memory and delay discount-
ing, will be described in a forthcoming report.
Behavioral session procedure. Each participant performed the task sit-
ting on a chair. To estimate individuals’ delay-discounting rates, the
current study used three delay conditions (10, 30, 60 s) for the larger
amount (40 squirts), and two delay conditions (10, 30 s) for the smaller
amount (20 squirts) (Jimura et al., 2009). The conditions were presented
pseudorandomly, and the participantsmade three choices for each of the
delay conditions. On the first trial of each delay condition, the choice was
between a larger delayed amount and an immediate reward that was half
of the delayed amount. For each delay condition, after the first trial, the
amount of immediate reward was adjusted based on the participant’s
preceding choice. If the participant had chosen the smaller, immediate
reward on the preceding trial, then the amount of the immediate reward
was decreased by half (i.e., 10 and 5 squirts for the 40 and 20 squirt
conditions, respectively); if the participant had chosen the larger, delayed
reward on the preceding trial, then the amount of the immediate reward
was increased by half (Jimura et al., 2009, 2011). The adjustment amount
was five squirts in the third trial in the 40 squirt condition. The subjective
value for the delayed reward was estimated to be equal to 1 ml (i.e., 2.5
squirts) more or less than the amount of immediate reward available on
the last trial (third and second trials in 40 and 20 squirt conditions,
respectively), depending on whether the delayed or immediate reward
had been chosen on that trial. Although satiety and timing constraints
resulted in only a few trials used at each delay and amount level for
subjective value estimation, our previous work suggests that delay dis-
counting in this paradigm is both robust and highly reliable at the indi-
vidual level (test–retest reliability, r 0.92) (Jimura et al., 2011).
Each experimental session beganwith two forced-choice trials and two
practice trials, which familiarized participants with the choice procedure
as well as with the rewards and delays. The syringes were refilled after
every six trials, and the maximum amount of liquid that could be ob-
tained in the session was 248 ml.
After the participants completed the task, they practiced drinking liq-
uid though a plastic tube in a supine position in a mock scanner. They
were instructed not to move their head while drinking, but were encour-
aged to move jaws and use muscles around the mouth to swallow the
liquid. It is important that participants could fully control liquid flow
into their mouth by holding down and releasing the button (see Behav-
ioral task, above), which enabled the flow rate to be kept at a level thatwas
comfortable without excess movement. After they completed five prac-
tice trials (three 16 ml and two 8ml trials), they were asked whether they
had any difficulties in drinking, and whether the practice drink was com-
fortable. No participants reported difficulties in drinking in the supine
position or significant changes in comfort relative to a sitting position.
fMRI session procedure. During fMRI scanning, participants engaged
in intertemporal decision-making trials that were similar to those of the
behavioral session. The primary difference was that the choice options
for each trial were prespecified (rather than adjusted across the session),
but set in an individualized manner based on discounting profile esti-
mated from the behavioral session. Three conditions (60 s/40squirts; 30
s/40squirts; 30 s/20squirts) were used to measure brain activity during
the delay period. The value of the IRwas systematicallymanipulated such
that, across trials, its value was one of the four different levels, 20, 40, 60,
or 80%, of the subjective value of the delayed reward, estimated for each
participant based on their choice profile in the behavioral session. This IR
manipulation biased decisions toward delayed options, as the IR value
was always smaller than the subjective value of delayed reward, providing
more opportunity to measure brain activity during the delay period.
Additionally, because the IR value was parametrically manipulated, it
allowed examination of the effect of this variable on choice performance
and brain activation.
When drinking liquid rewards, the participants were encouraged to
use jawmovements and mouth muscles for swallowing, but not to move
their head (a skill that had been practiced previously in a mock scanner
setup; see Behavioral session procedure, above). Analyses of drinking
relatedmovements and their effects on image quality indicated that these
were minimal (see Liquid delivery in fMRI session, below).
Each scanning run included six trials, with three or four scanning runs
performed in the session, depending on the satiety of the participant. All
trial variables (IR value, delay, amount of delayed rewards) were pseudo-
randomly intermixed within and across scans, with the constraint that
the two middle IR levels were presented twice for each condition. Each
experimental session began with two forced-choice trials and two prac-
tice trials, which familiarized participants with the choice procedure as
well as with the rewards and delays. Themaximum amount of liquid that
could be obtained in the fMRI session was 344 ml.
It is important to note that the experimental design and procedure
minimized any trial-by-trial learning and adjustment of choice biases
across trials within the session. First, at the time of the scanning session,
participantswere highly familiarwith the decision-making paradigmand
associated reward consumption, having already experienced a previous
behavioral session, mock-scanner training, and presession familiariza-
tion trials. Second, as described above, we previously found choice pref-
erences to be highly stable across sessions (Jimura et al., 2011). Finally,
the ITI (duration from the offset of liquid delivery to the onset of the next
choice) was long (1min) and filled with distractor trials that disrupted
memory for previous trial choices and encouraged participants to treat
each trial as a one-shot decision.
Imaging procedures. fMRI scanning was conducted on a whole-body
Siemens 3T Trio System. A pillow and tape were used to minimize head
movement in the head coil. Headphones dampened scanner noise and
enabled communication with participants. Both anatomical and func-
tional images were acquired from each participant. High-resolution an-
atomical images were acquired using an MP-RAGE T1-weighted
sequence [repetition time (TR), 9.7 s; echo time (TE), 4.0 ms; flip angle
(FA), 10°; slice thickness, 1 mm; in-plane resolution, 1 1mm2]. Func-
tional [blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)] images were acquired
using a gradient echo-planar imaging sequence (TR, 2.0 s; TE, 27ms; FA,
90°; slice thickness, 4 mm; in-plane resolution, 4 4 mm2; 34 slices) in
parallel to the anterior–posterior commissure line, allowing complete
brain coverage at a high signal-to-noise ratio. Each functional run in-
volved 512 volume acquisitions.
Liquid delivery in fMRI session. Liquid was delivered from the outside
of the scanner room through a plastic tube, which enabled participants to
consume the liquid during fMRI administration. The liquid consump-
tion period partially covers the BOLD window associated with the (end
of) delay period (Fig. 1C). Head motion was in fact greater during liquid
consumption compared to button pressing during the money-
discounting distractor task. However, the absolute magnitude of head
motion during consumption was small, with maximum translations of
(0.06, 0.09, 0.28 mm) (0.05, 0.05, 0.19 mm) (mean SD), and max-
imumrotations of (0.25, 0.08, 0.06) (0.17, 0.06, 0.03) degrees, along x-,
y-, and z-axes, respectively.
Nonetheless, it is known that jaw movements can yield significant
instability in echoplanar images, as based on nonhuman primate scan-
ning (Keliris et al., 2007). However, inspections of our pilot scan showed
such effects were minimal, due to the instructions and practice partici-
pants had with drinking in a supine position. In fact, instability may not
have been present in the current study, as comparable EPI quality was
present during consumption, compared to the fixation period. Finally,
when examining BOLD activation during the consumption period, ro-
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bust activations were observed, with prominent foci in somatotopic re-
gions of mouth in the primary motor and sensory cortices, and in
primary gustatory cortex. Given these results, we felt confident in assum-
ing that movement-derived contamination during liquid consumption
wasminimal in the current study. Detailed results and activationmaps of
movement-related effects and consumption-related activity can be pro-
vided upon request.
Assessment of individual differences in delay-discounting effects. From
the behavioral session, themain effect of delay discounting was analyzed,
first by conducting a repeated-measures one-way ANOVA with delay as
a factor. A planned contrast on (log-) delay was then tested (Jimura et al.,
2009, 2010). Participants were sorted into three groups—steep (STP),
shallow (SHL), and intermediate (INT), based on visual inspection of
their different discounting rates. The group effect was formally tested by
entering group as an additional factor in the ANOVA. This test for group
differences is more stringent than those based on model-fits of the data
because it directly tests delay discounting (i.e., that the delay effect on
subjective valuewill interact with group)without relying on any assump-
tion regarding the direction or form of the effect.
Individual differences in delay discounting were quantified by calcu-
lating the area under the discounting curve (AuC) (Myerson et al., 2001;
Sellitto et al., 2010; Jimura et al., 2011). The AuC represents the area
under the observed subjective values at a given delay; more specifically,
the AuC is calculated as the sum of the trapezoid areas under the indif-
ference points normalized by the amount and delay (Myerson et al.,
2001). Both subjective value and delay are normalized for purposes of
calculating the AuC, which, as a result, ranges between 0.0 (maximally
steep discounting) and 1.0 (no discounting). It has been argued that the
AuC is the best measure of delay discounting to use for individual differ-
ence analyses, because it is theoretically neutral (i.e., assumption free)
and also psychometrically reliable (Myerson et al., 2001).
An alternate approach to characterizing delay-discounting profile is to
fit the discount function (either at the group or individual level) to a
specific theoretical model. For example, the hyperbolic model of delay
discounting, which is very popular and well validated (Rachlin et al.,
1991; Green and Myerson, 2004; Kable and Glimcher, 2007), specifies
that delay discounting can be characterized by the k parameter in the
function A/(1kD), where A is amount, and D is delay. The current
study used AuC rather than k to characterize individual differences in
delay discounting, because AuC is more psychometrically stable than k
(Myerson et al., 2001) (see above). Nevertheless, the two measures tend
to be highly similar in their characterization of individual differences in
delay-discounting profiles. Indeed, this assumption was validated by a
Spearman’s rank-ordered correlation coefficient of 0.99 between indi-
viduals’ discounting factor k andAuC for the current study.Wedid fit the
group average discounting function with the hyperbolic model (using
maximum likelihood estimation) so that a group-level k value could also
be estimated; this value was subsequently used for model-based fMRI
analyses of delay-period activity dynamics. However, the k value was not
used in any individual difference analyses.
AuC was smaller in the smaller amount (20 squirts) condition than in
the larger amount (40 squirts) condition (t(42) 2.31; p 0.05; based on
two choices) (Jimura et al., 2009), replicating the amount effect observed
in our previous report (Jimura et al., 2009). However, AuCs for the larger
and smaller amount also correlated across participants (r 0.61, t(41)
4.91, p 0.001), suggesting that individual differences in AuC were un-
related to the amount effect. Thus, for each participant, we averaged the
AuCs for the larger and smaller amount conditions, and this averaged AuC
was used in the imaging analysis to represent individual differences in delay
discounting. Finally, it is important to note that AuC values and assignment
to the discounting group were determined solely by performance in the
behavioral session; therefore, individual differences analyses of the fMRI
data (which were based on AuC) were unbiased.
Imaging analysis. All functional images were first temporally aligned
across the brain volume, corrected for movement using a rigid-body
rotation and translation correction, and then registered to the partici-
pant’s anatomical images to correct for movement between the anatom-
ical and function scans. The data were then intensity normalized to a
fixed value, resampled into 3 mm isotropic voxels, and spatially
smoothed with a 9 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
Participants’ anatomical images were transformed into standardized Ta-
lairach atlas space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) using a 12-
dimensional affine transformation. The functional images were then
registered to the reference brain using the alignment parameters derived
for the anatomical scans.
A general linear model (GLM) approach was used to separately esti-
mate parameter values for each event occurring in the task. Events were
further convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function.
The focus of the analysis was on trials in which the delayed option was
chosen. Consequently, both the distractor tasks and choice trials inwhich
the immediate optionwas chosenwere coded by events of no interest and
not analyzed further.
On delayed option trials, a set of independent regressors coded for
each of three trial periods: choice, delay, and reward delivery. The choice
period was estimated by an event beginning with visual presentation of
choice options and ending when the choice response was made. The
duration of this period was thus equivalent to the choice reaction time.
An additional parametric regressor during this period was used to code
the IR value associated with the trial (four levels, normalized). Reward
delivery was estimated with two events, a first transient event of no in-
terest that coded the period during presentation of the instruction screen
that indicated liquid was available, and a second longer event that coded
(with a boxcar function) when the liquid was consumed (beginning with
the first button press and ending when liquid delivery was completed).
The delay period before reward delivery was estimated by an event
coded with two model-based regressors (Fig. 1C; additionally, on 60 s
delay trials, a transient event of no interest was used to code the change in
display color that occurred at the 30 s delay point). The first modeled a
hypothesized dynamic increase in subjective value across the delay pe-
riod, consistent with many neurocomputational and neuroeconomic
models (Montague and Berns 2002; Berns et al., 2006; Kalenscher and
Pennartz, 2008).We used a hyperbolic function to capture this pattern of
delay-related increase, since this function has been used successfully in
many theoretical accounts of delay discounting (Rachlin et al., 1991;
Green and Myerson, 2004). To model delay-related SV dynamics with
this function, we used SV  1/(1  kt), where t represents the time to
reward delivery. The k parameter value was taken from the group mean
discounting data in the behavioral session to provide a more stable fit of
the model to delay-period activity. As illustrated in Figure 1C, the sub-
jective value function gradually increases from the start of the delay
toward the reward outcome. The second regressor coded AU, which
reflects the positive utility derived from anticipation of a future reward
(Loewenstein, 1987). Previous empirical and theoretical studies have
postulated that AU is a complementary construct to SV, and thus maxi-
mal at the start of the waiting period and decreasing as the time to reward
delivery grows near (Loewenstein, 1987; Berns et al., 2006). For simplic-
ity, and to reflect the complementarity between AU and SV, we defined
AU  1  SV. Importantly, although SV and AU are anticorrelated,
when convolved with a hemodynamic response function, they produce
dissociable BOLD regression functions (Fig. 1C). Specifically, the corre-
lations between the SV and AU regressors were 0.18 and 0.51 for the 60
and 30 s conditions, respectively, allowing reasonable dissociation (cf.
Otten et al., 2002). We also empirically double checked the dissociability
in separate control GLM analyses in which only one of the two compo-
nents was modeled. Highly similar results obtained when compared to
the primary analyses, confirming that multicollinearity was not an issue.
It is worth noting that the form of the SV and AU representations
incorporated in the analysis reflects a theoretical assumption, as some
alternative models have postulated alternate functions to describe delay-
discounting phenomena, such as exponential (Rachlin et al., 1991; Green
and Myerson, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008) or subadditive (Read, 2001;
Kable and Glimcher, 2010), rather than hyperbolic. Likewise, some ac-
counts of AU postulate a linearly decreasing (Berns et al., 2006) or non-
monotonic delay function (i.e., peaking at some mid-delay point)
(Loewenstein, 1987). Furthermore, some computational models do not
even postulate that value representations are continuously maintained
during delay periods (e.g., Brown et al., 1999;O’Reilly, 2006), and/or that
value updates occur only in a cue-triggered fashion (O’Doherty et al.,
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2003; Redish, 2004; Seymour et al., 2004). Unfortunately, in the current
data set we did not have sufficient statistical power to appropriately test
and compare these alternative models in terms of their respective fits to
the data. Thus, our use of the hyperbolic SVmodel, and the complemen-
tary AU model, is one of convenience, since these capture the broad
qualitative characteristics of the functions we are interested in; we do not
make any strong claims about the fit. Nevertheless, given the theoretical
importance ascribed to distinctions between different discounting mod-
els, future research efforts could optimize the experimental design pio-
neered here to specifically focus on model comparison.
Parameter estimates for each subject were submitted to a group anal-
ysis using a voxelwise random-effects model. A whole-brain exploratory
analysis was first performed to identify brain regions exhibiting subjec-
tive value and anticipatory utility effects during the delay period. Specif-
ically, at each voxel, parameter estimates were identified that were
significantly greater than zero at the group level (i.e., increased relative to
baseline; p 0.001), using cluster size thresholding to correct for multi-
ple comparisons via the AlphaSim Monte Carlo procedure (http://afni.
nimh.nih.gov/afni/). Significant voxel clusters were identified that
surpassed a whole-brain corrected threshold of p  0.05. Since this ap-
proach identified a large cluster that included both the vmPFC and VS
(see Results) (Table 1), the VS effect was tested separately within an
anatomically defined region of interest in VS created from TTatlastlrc
Dataset (http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni/doc/misc/afni_ttatlas). Specifi-
cally, the VS was defined by voxels that fell within the region labeled as
nucleus accumbens. Significance was then assessed by the threshold
p 0.05, corrected within the VS volume.
The analysis of IR value effects aimed to test whether the regions
showing delay-period effects also showed choice-related effects in inter-
temporal decision making, as the IR manipulation provides a good esti-
mate of decision value. Accordingly, to test for IR value effects, voxel
clusters (p  0.05 uncorrected) were identified within the regions of
interest (ROIs) that showed delay effects. The vmPFC and VS ROIs were
defined as regions showing the subjective value effect (p 0.05, uncor-
rected), and anterior PFC (aPFC) ROIs were defined as regions showing
the anticipatory utility effect (p  0.05, uncorrected). Then, the size of
the cluster was tested, correcting for multiple comparison within each
ROI using a Monte Carlo procedure. Significant clusters were then re-
ported using a volume-corrected threshold of p  0.05. For individual
difference effects, voxelwise Pearson correlation coefficients were com-
puted between behavioral measurements of delay-discounting profile
(i.e., AuC) andBOLDGLMparameter estimates for the choice period, IR
value, delay period, and reward delivery effects. The significance of these
voxel clusters was assessed using the samemethod as just described for IR
value (for similar approaches, see Jimura and Braver, 2010; Jimura et al.,
2010).
To illustrate the subjective value and anticipatory utility effects and
their individual differences, the delay-related time courses were directly
estimated (rather than fit to a specific model function; Figs. 3, 4). This
was done via an independent first-level GLM analysis that removed the
subjective value and anticipatory utility regressors from the model. After
removing these regressors, the residual time courses were extracted from
the delay period to visualize the effects that were present during this
period. Before visualization, the time series was first subjected to a band-
pass filter (high cut, 15 s; low cut, 150 s) to remove transient activity and
low-frequency signal drifts.
Functional connectivity analysis: primary model. A multilevel mixed
effect general linear model (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) was used to
examine functional connectivity relationships between vmPFC, VS, and
aPFC. This type of multiple regression analysis does not directly test the
causal pathway linking the regions, but instead assumes a particular con-
nectivity pattern in which VS receives inputs from aPFC and vmPFC.We
think this pattern is more plausible than other logically possible patterns.
Specifically, as suggested by previouswork, VSmay represent the reward-
related estimation error or discrepancy (Hare et al., 2008; Rolls et al.,
2008; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010b; Daw et al., 2011) between the represen-
tation of SV signaled from vmPFC (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Ballard
and Knutson, 2009; Sellitto et al., 2010) and the current utility due to
anticipation (i.e., the AU) signaled by aPFC (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007;
Schacter et al., 2007; Glimcher, 2009; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010b; Benoit et
al., 2011).
The model included two levels, one for within-subject effects (i.e., IR
value), and the other for between-subject effects (i.e., AuC). The within-
subject level was modeled as follows:
XVS  aPFC XaPFC  aPFC-IR XaPFC YIR
 vmPFC XvmPFC  vmPFC-IR XvmPFC YIR
 IR YIR
 const  VS, (1)
where  values indicate regression coefficients, X values indicate brain
activity of each trial (see below),YIR denotes the amount of the IR on each
trial, and  is an error term. In this level, the VS activation was predicted
by the aPFC and vmPFC activations (i.e., XaPFC and XvmPFC), the imme-
diate reward (YIR), and their interactions with IR (i.e., YIR XaPFC and YIR
XvmPFC).
Then, the higher-level between-subject effects were modeled as
follows:
aPFC  aPFC-AuC XAuC  aPFC-const  aPFC, (2)
aPFC-IR  aPFC-AuC-IR XAuC  aPFC-IR-const  aPFC-IR, (3)
vmPFC  vmPFC-const  vmPFC, (4)
vmPFC-IR  vmPFC-IR-const  vmPFC-IR, (5)
IR  IR-AuC XAuC  IR-const  IR, (6)
const  const-AuC XAuC  const-const  const, (7)
Table 1. Brain regions showing significant effects of subjective value and anticipatory utility during delay period
Coordinate
Effect Area BA x y z Cluster size z value
Subjective value Medial temporal 20/36 42 38 32 28 4.4
Medial frontal/ventral striatum 25/32/24 1 26 5 906 5.4
Visual/medial temporal 19 29 86 0 695 5.6
Visual 19 23 93 4 474 5.9
Lateral frontal 44/45 41 27 8 41 3.8
Lateral frontal 6/4 34 5 52 34 3.6
Medial frontal 6 10 3 64 61 4.1
Anticipatory utility Anterior frontal 10/47/11 28 54 7 42 4.1
Anterior frontal 10/47/11 31 55 7 32 4.4
Medial temporal 37/19 19 64 7 102 3.9
Medial temporal 37/19 18 60 5 63 3.5
Medial parietal 19/7 5 81 30 49 3.4
Coordinates are the center of the cluster and listed in Talairach space (17). BA is the Brodmann area near the coordinates and is approximate. The size of the cluster is indicated by the number of voxels.
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where  values indicate regression coefficients that were decomposed
into interactions of the AuC and constant terms from the  values mod-
eled in the lower-level model in Equation 1. In this level, the modeled
parameters in Equation 4 were further predicted by the degree of delay
discounting (AuC) of individuals. Because vmPFC did not show any
individual differences effect of AuC (see Results), AuC-related influences
were not included in Equations 4 and 5.
The ROIs were defined in a manner that was unbiased with respect to
these effects: VSwas defined anatomically in the left hemisphere based on
the TTatlastlrc Dataset (see Imaging analysis, above); aPFC was de-
fined in the left hemisphere, as a spherewith a 6mmradius from the peak
voxel of mean signal magnitude for the group-level AU effect; and
vmPFC was defined similarly, but for the SV effect (for a similar ap-
proach, see Jimura et al., 2010).
Then in those ROIs, the fMRI time courses relative to fixation baseline
were extracted from a 92 s epoch (62 s in short delay trials): 62 s (32 s)
before the start of reward delivery to 30 s after the start of reward delivery.
This time window fully covered the trial period from the onset of choices
to when liquid consumption was complete. The activation data were
high-pass filtered (cutoff, 150 s) to remove low-frequency signal drift. In
the first analysis, all of the time points within the epoch were averaged
together to create a single value for each trial. These values were
extracted for each ROI, in each trial, and for each participant, and then
included into the model, along with relevant coefficients coding the IR
value for that trial and the AuC for that participant.
In a separate analysis, different models were constructed for each trial
period separately (choice, delay, reward delivery). The choice period was
defined as an epoch spanning from 62 s (or 32 s in short delay trials) to
52 s (or 22 s in short delay trials) before the start of reward delivery. The
delay period was defined as 50 s (20 s) before the start of reward delivery
to the start of reward delivery. The reward delivery period was defined as
2 s after the start of reward delivery to 30 s after the start of reward
delivery. In the delay and reward delivery models, IR value effects were
excluded as coefficients in themodel (under the assumption that IR value
effects did not influence these epochs). For each of themodels, unknown
parameters were all simultaneously estimated using the lme4 procedure
in R (http://www.r-project.org).
Functional connectivity analysis control models. To examine the speci-
ficity of model predictors in the multilevel mixed-effect analysis, the
original model (i.e., VS activation influenced by aPFC and vmPFC in-
puts, and further modulated by IR and the AuC: Model I; see Multilevel
mixed-effect GLM: primarymodel, above) wasmodified in the following
ways and then tested.
In the firstmodification (Model II), vmPFC activation and interaction
effects involving vmPFCwere eliminated from the original model. In the
second modification (Model III), aPFC activation and interaction terms
were instead eliminated from the original model. These control models
allowed to us examine whether the observed effects were due to the
multicollinearity between the vmPFC and aPFC effects. It also allowed us
to test whether inclusion of the aPFC and vmPFC improved model fit-
ness in terms of Akaike’s (1974) (AIC) and Bayesian information criteria
(BIC) (Schwarz, 1978).
A second set of control models tested whether the results could be
explained by averaging the epoch into a single value, or by the high
degrees of freedom present in the model. To examine this, we tested
models that involved replacement of aPFC- and vmPFC-related terms
with plausible “substitute” brain regions that could serve as controls.
Model IV replaced vmPFC with a lateral occipitotemoral region (LOT)
that showed the SV effect during delay period, with a similar pattern to
vmPFC (Table 1). Model V replaced aPFC instead, with amedial tempo-
ral lobe (MTL) region that showed theAUeffect during delay periodwith
a pattern similar to that of aPFC (Table 1). The regions of interest in LOT
and MTL were defined by a homologous procedure used in the original
model, as spheres with 6 mm radii from the peak voxel of mean signal
magnitude in the subjective value (LOT) or anticipatory utility (MTL)
effect across the participants.
Results
Behavioral results
In the behavioral session, participants showed significant delay
discounting for liquid rewards, which occurred on the order of
seconds (delay effect, F(1,42) 20.2, p 0.0001; Fig. 2A), consis-
tent with our previous reports (Jimura et al., 2009, 2011). The
group mean data were then fit to a standard hyperbolic model of
delay discounting, and kwas estimated at 0.015 (based on amax-
imum likelihood estimation fitting procedure). This k value was
used in model-based analyses of the fMRI data from the delay
period (see Delay period activation, below).
Participants were then classified into three groups, based on
their delay-discounting pattern, as quantified by AuC (see Mate-
rials and Methods), and assessed in the behavioral session (Fig.
2A): steep discounters (N  15), shallow discounters (N  15),
and an intermediate group (N  13). A two-way ANOVA with
group (STP, INT, and SHL) and delay (10, 30, and 60 s) as factors
confirmed a significant main effect of group (F(2,40) 54.0, p
0.0001) and interaction of delay and group (F(2,40)  4.01, p 
0.05). Although the groups significantly also differed in AuC
(STP, 0.58  0.10, mean  SD; INT, 0.76  0.04; SHL, 0.88 
0.04; F(2,40) 78.6, p 0.0001), it is important to note that group
classification was done only for ease of description and visualiza-
tion; the groups were arbitrarily defined. As such, primary anal-
yses of individual differences used continuous correlations with
AuC as the independent variable.
The fMRI session focused on activation associatedwith selection
ofdelayedrewards; consequently, tobiasparticipantchoicebehavior
toward the delayed option, the liquid amount associated with the
immediateoptionwas individually adjustedaccording to the subjec-
tive value of delayed reward estimated in the behavioral estimation
session (see Materials and Methods). This manipulation was suc-
cessful, as participants exhibited a significant preference for the de-
layed option (t(42) 15.6, p 0.001).However, this choice bias was
modulated by the relative IR value (expressed as a proportion of the
delayed reward estimated subjective value; see Materials andMeth-
ods): in trials with higher IR, the preference for the delayed option
was lower (t(42)3.21,p0.01;Fig. 1D).Nevertheless, IReffectson
choice bias did not interact with individual differences in discount-
ing (r 0.22, p 0.16). This finding indicates that the individual-
ized adjustment procedure was successful in equating the subjective
value of the IR amount across participants.
Delay-period activation
Most models of intertemporal choice behavior postulate that
subjective value of a delayed reward decays rapidly as the time to
Figure 2. A, In the behavioral session, the participants showed robust delay discounting. Each
participant was classified into one of the three groups based on the steepness of the discounting
[shallow(SHL; self-controlled), steep(STP; impulsive),and intermediate (INT)].B, In the fMRIsession,
participants’ choiceswere consistently biased toward the delayed option, but choice probabilitywas
modulated by the relative value of the immediate reward (IR) value. Error bars indicate SEM.
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its delivery increases, following a nonlin-
ear function (Rachlin et al., 1991; Green
andMyerson, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008). A
corollary of this postulate is that individ-
uals can continuously estimate the sub-
jective value of a future reward (Hare et
al., 2008; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010b) (of-
ten referred to as the goal value). This
value estimate may dynamically evolve
from the time of choice until reward de-
livery in a nonlinear manner, as suggested
by delay-discounting models (Montague
and Berns, 2002; Kalenscher and
Pennartz, 2008). Thus, such brain regions
may show a dynamic increase in activa-
tion during thewaiting period for the cho-
sen delayed reward (Roesch et al., 2006;
Kalenscher and Pennartz 2008; Gregorios-
Pippas et al., 2009).
The current study directly tested this
hypothesis by continuously monitoring
brain activation while participants waited
for their upcoming reward (Fig. 1B). Al-
though the exact form of the time-
dependent anticipation function has been
controversial (Read, 2001; Green and
Myerson, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008), hy-
perbolic functions have repeatedly been
shown to describe discounting patterns
well (Rachlin et al., 1991; Kable and
Glimcher, 2007). Thus, we used a model-
based approach to explorewhether activa-
tion dynamics could be explained by a
hyperbolically increasing pattern during
the delay period. Each of the two delay
durations (30 and 60 s) was modeled by a
standard hyperbolic delay-discounting
function, convolved with a canonical he-
modynamic response function (Fig. 1C;
see Materials and Methods).
A number of brain regions were iden-
tified, including predominant foci within
the vmPFC and VS (Fig. 3A,B; Table 1).
Even when defining the VS through anatomical rather than func-
tional criteria, the effect was still significant (left, z  4.13, p 
0.001, corrected; right, z 3.66, p 0.001, corrected). The time
courses of the delay-period activations confirmed that in both the
VS and vmPFC there was a gradual increase in activation that
accelerated inmagnitude toward the reward consumption period
and was present for both long and short delay durations (Fig.
3A,B, right).
Examination of the postdecision period also enabled identifica-
tion of a distinct dynamic component of subjective value related to
anticipation. It has been suggested that anticipation of a future re-
ward can provide positive utility that involves complementary char-
acteristics to the time-discounted goal value (Loewenstein, 1987;
Berns et al., 2006, 2007;Prelec andLoewenstein, 1991) (seeMaterials
and Methods). Therefore, in brain regions coding for anticipatory
utility, the pattern of activation dynamics would be expected to be
maximal at thebeginningof thedelaywhenanticipation is strongest,
and decreasing thereafter as the time to reward delivery approaches
(Loewenstein, 1987; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Berns et al.,
2007).Wetested for regions fittingadelay-relatedfunctionmodeledas
thecomplementof thesubjectivevaluefunction(Fig.1C)(seeMaterials
andMethods). This formulation is simple, but still retains the basic
characteristics of an anticipatory utility function. A whole-brain ex-
ploratory analysis identifiedmultiple brain regions fitting this pat-
tern, including ventral parts of the aPFC bilaterally (Fig. 3C;
Table 1). The time courses exhibited an initial uprising of
activation, followed by a gradual decrease during the delay
period (Fig. 3C, right).
These time courses are based on residuals after removing
choice- and consumption-related effects (see also Materials and
Methods). Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the
interpretability of the delay-period effects is strengthened by
the delay lengths used in the design (i.e., 30 and 60 s), since these
are substantially longer than the canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse epoch (cf. Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009). Specifically,
while the subjective value effect showed the primary acceleration
of activity beginning at least 20 s after the cue, the anticipatory
utility effect was still continuing to decay during this period. By
this point in the delay period, all residual cue-related (i.e., choice-
period) hemodynamic activity would have dissipated.
Figure 3. Brain regions showing dynamic activation time courses related to subjective value and anticipatory utility effects
during the delay period. A–C, Statistical significancemaps (left) illustrate ventromedial prefrontal cortex (A) and ventral striatum
(B) showing the subjective value effect, and anterior prefrontal cortex (C) showing the anticipatory utility effect. Time courses
(right) demonstrate gradual increase (A,B) and decrease (C) toward the reward outcome in both of the short and long delay trials.
Note that choice- and consumption-related effects are subtracted out of these time courses. The color bars indicate significance
levels. Gray arrowheads indicate background color changes in 60 s conditions. A, Anterior; L, left.
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Individual differences effects
The identification of regions demonstrating delay-related activa-
tion dynamics that are consistent with the coding of subjective
value (vmPFC and VS) and anticipatory utility (aPFC) raises the
additional possibility that these regions reflect individual differ-
ences in impulsivity and self-control, respectively. If this hypoth-
esis is correct, patient (self-controlled) individuals should show
increased activation in brain regions coding for anticipatory util-
ity during postchoice delay periods. Conversely, impulsive indi-
viduals should exhibit a steeper activity rise in value-related brain
regions while waiting for a delayed reward, as they show steeper
discounting effects in those brain regions during choice (Mischel
et al., 1989; Kirby et al., 1999; Green and Myerson 2004; Berns et
al., 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Ballard and Knutson
2009; Madden et al., 2009).
To test this hypothesis, we examined whether the ROIs show-
ing delay-related activity also showed sensitivity to individual
differences in delay-discounting pattern, quantified as the AuC
value in the delay-discounting plot (see Materials andMethods).
It is important to note that these analyses were unbiased, since
individual differences were assessed purely on the basis of dis-
counting behavior in the out-of-scanner behavioral session, and
thus were independent of in-scanner behavior and brain activity.
No individual differences effects were observed in vmPFC;
however, in the left VS region, a significant negative correlation
was observed between AuC and delay-period activation dynam-
ics [Fig. 4A; (13, 8,6); 12 voxels; p 0.001, corrected within
the anatomically defined VS region]. The negative direction of
the correlation indicates that the increasing pattern of activation
dynamics was preferentially present in steep discounters. As
shown in the time courses displaying the patterns in the three
discounting groups (Fig. 4A, right), steep discounters showed a
more prominent increase during both the long and short delay-
period trials. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation
that individual differences in impulsivity are associated with a
more strongly discounted subjective value representation (Kirby
et al., 1999; Berns et al., 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2007, 2010;
Ballard and Knutson, 2009; Madden and Bickel, 2009), which
then increases during the delay period.
Interestingly, theanticipatoryutility effect inaPFCwasalsomod-
ulated by individual differences in delay discounting, with a signifi-
cant positive correlation in left aPFCobserved betweenAuCand the
anticipatory effect [(31, 47,10); 27 voxels; p 0.05, corrected;
Fig. 4B; see Materials and Method]. This positive correlation sug-
gests a larger anticipatoryutility effect in shallowerdiscounters.Crit-
ically, this individual difference effect was opposite to that observed
in the VS region, in that the delay-related aPFC activity was associ-
ated with greater patience rather than impulsivity.
Choice-period effects
To test whether these regions play a central role in intertemporal
decisionmaking, we next examined whether the vmPFC, VS, and
aPFC ROIs also exhibited consistent patterns of activation and
individual difference effects during choice periods. We first fo-
Figure4. Individual differences in delay-period dynamics.A, Ventral striatumshoweda correlation between the subjective value effect and individual delay discounting rates. The statisticalmap
(left) showed a negative correlation, indicating a larger subjective value effect in steep discounters. The time courses (right) demonstrate larger subjective value effects in steep discounters in both
of thedelay conditions.B, Anterior prefrontal cortex showeda correlationbetweenanticipatoryutility effect and individuals’ delaydiscounting. Complementary to theventral striatum, the statistical
maps (left) showed apositive correlation, indicating the larger effect in shallowdiscounters.White closed lines indicate brain regions that showed anticipatory utility effect ( p 0.05, uncorrected).
The time courses (right) demonstrate greater activation in the initial part of the delay period in shallow discounters. Note that choice- and consumption-related effects are subtracted out of these
time courses. Gray arrowheads indicate background color changes in 60 s conditions. SFG, Superior frontal gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; GR, gyrus rectus.
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cused on the effects of decision value by focusing on the trial IR
variable, since this factor was found to significantly modulate
choice bias (Fig. 2B). It is important to note that because this
analysis was restricted to the ROIs identified previously solely on
the basis of delay-related activity (i.e., unbiased by choice effects;
see Materials and Methods), any further modulation by choice
would provide strong indication of functional involvement in
both choice and postchoice delay-related processes.
It was found that during choice of the delayed option, the
relative IR value modulated both VS and vmPFC, with stronger
activation on trials with higher IR [vmPFC, (1, 36,2), 75 voxels,
p 0.05, corrected; Fig. 5A; left VS, (12, 7,7), 17 voxels, p
0.001, corrected; Fig. 5B]. This pattern is again consistent with
the interpretation that the IR manipulation reflected a change in
the subjective value of the immediate reward (Kirby et al., 1999;
Berns et al., 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2007, 2010; Ballard and
Knutson, 2009; Madden and Bickel, 2009) or the total reward
available on the trial (Cai et al., 2011).
In the left VS, choice-related activation was also sensitive to
individual differences in delay discounting, such that steep dis-
counters showed stronger choice-related activation [(13, 9,
7), 17 voxels, p 0.01, corrected; Fig. 5C]. However, the indi-
vidual difference effects were related to IR, such that on high-IR
trials individual differences were significant (AuC correlation,
r0.32, p 0.05), while on low-IR trials the effects were not
(r0.12, p 0.45; Fig. 5D). One possible interpretation of this
pattern is that impulsive individuals respondmore strongly to the
value of the immediate reward, but that this effect is particularly
prominent when the immediate reward is close in subjective
value to the delayed reward (i.e., on high-IR trials).
Finally, choice-related individual difference effects were also
observed in left aPFC [(29, 54, 4); 44 voxels; r  0.42; p 
0.05, cluster-size corrected; Fig. 5E]; however, the correlationwas
in the opposite direction to that seen in VS, such that shallow
discounters showed increased choice-related activation relative
to steep discounters (Fig. 5F).
Functional connectivity analysis
The complementary patterns of activation dynamics and individ-
ual differences found in aPFC, VS, and vmPFC suggest that these
regions subserve distinct functional roles during intertemporal
decision making. First, the aPFC data are consistent with an an-
ticipatory utility account (Loewenstein, 1987). Second, the re-
sults also suggest that vmPFC and VS may code different aspects
of subjective value, since only the VS showed consistent effects
associated with impulsivity. This finding is consistent with previ-
ous reports indicating that vmPFC appears to reliably track goal
value, i.e., the forecasted and time-discounted value of the reward
Figure 5. Brain activity during choice period. A, B, Choice-period activations correlated with immediate reward value in ventral striatum (A) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (B). C, Ventral
striatumactivity also showedanegative correlationwith individual differences indelaydiscounting rate.D, These ventral striatumpatterns are illustratedbypresentingestimated signalmagnitudes
for the high and low immediate reward values in each of the discounting groups. Conversely, anterior prefrontal cortex showed positive correlation between activation and degree of delay
discounting (E, blue arrowhead), indicating larger activation in shallower discounting individuals (F ). The formats are similar to those in Figure 4B (left). Error bars indicate SEM. VS, ventral striatum;
aPFC, anterior prefrontal cortex.
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outcome, while VS might be more accurately characterized as
coding the discrepancy between prior expectations regarding the
goal value and the currently experienced reward utility (i.e., a
reward prediction error) (Hare et al., 2008; Rolls et al., 2008;
Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010b; Daw et al., 2011). Putting these hy-
potheses together, one possible model of functional connectivity
related to valuation is that VS activity dynamics arise frommod-
ulation by both vmPFC and aPFC inputs, reflecting both the goal
value and potential sources of utility derived from anticipation of
a delayed reward.
We directly examined this hypothesis in a multiple regression
analysis, implemented with a hierarchical mixed-effect general
linear model (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) that tested whether
VS activation could be predicted by joint inputs from aPFC and
vmPFC, along with their modulation by both trial-by-trial vari-
ability related to IR value and between-subjects variability related
to delay discounting (see Materials and Methods). As shown in
Table 2, the following predictors explained significant variance in
VS activation: (1) vmPFCactivation (t(651) 5.87, p 0.001); (2)
the interaction of vmPFC activity and IR value (t(651) 3.28, p
0.01); (3) the interaction of aPFC and IR value (t(651)  3.80,
p 0.001); and (4) the interaction of aPFC and the AuC (t(651)
2.30, p 0.01). Figure 6 also provides a graphical depiction of
the statistical model of functional connectivity relationships. The
first two effects indicate that VS activation was increased when
vmPFC activation increased, and this effect was further amplified
on high-IR trials. The last two effects were negative terms indi-
cating that VS activation was decreased when aPFC activity in-
creased, with amplified effects on high-IR trials and in high-AuC
individuals (shallow discounters).
In a second stage of the analysis, we examined functional in-
teractions between the three regions when considering just the
choice and delay periods separately (i.e., in two separate mixed-
level models; Table 2). Although this second-stage analysis was
much lower powered and thus more highly conservative, very
similar patterns were nevertheless obtained. Specifically, in both
the choice and delay periods it was found that vmPFC provided a
significant positive influence onVS activity, while aPFC showed a
significant negative influence.
A key implication of the functional connectivity analysis is
that aPFC and vmPFC exert the same modulatory influence on
VS activation during decisionmaking (the choice period) as they
do during the delay period after the decision has been made. In
particular, the results suggest that these regions have similar
functional roles during the delay period and during decision
making per se. As such, they provide clearer evidence for conti-
nuity in the representation of value information during different
phases of the decision-making process. The functional role of
such value representations during the post-choice delay may be
the maintenance of both the utility associated with anticipation
and a continuously updated prediction of the value of the up-
coming reward.
Control analyses: alternate functional connectivity models
A series of control models were tested to examine the specificity
of the effects observed in the functional connectivity analysis
from the primary model (i.e., full-trial model; hereafter, Model
I). In one set of control models, one of the input regions was
removed to examine its effect on VS activity prediction. These
models indicated that when the vmPFC input was removed
(Model II), the aPFC effects were still present (aPFC by AuC,
t(653)3.34, p 0.001; aPFC by IR, t(653)2.00, p 0.05),
and when the aPFC input was removed (Model III), the vmPFC
effects were still present (vmPFC, t(656) 5.01, p 0.001; vmPFC
by IR, t(656) 2.56, p 0.01). This result confirms that the inputs
from these two regions were statistically independent predictors
of VS activation, and the observed effects from the full model
were not a result of multicollinearity artifacts introduced by
jointly including the two predictors. More importantly, we used
the tests of model fitness, AIC (Akaike, 1974) and BIC (Schwarz,
1978), to quantitatively compare these control models to the
original (Model I); poorer fits were found in both cases (i.e.,
higher AIC/BIC values; Model I, AIC, 1889; BIC, 1996; Model II,
AIC, 2020; BIC, 2074; Model III, AIC, 2001; BIC, 2038).
In a second set of control models, we replaced each of the
regions with a control region that also showed a similar dynamic
activation effect during the delay period (seeMaterials andMeth-
ods). Thus, we replaced the vmPFC region with a region in extra-
striate visual cortex (LOT; Model IV) that was also identified in
the SV analysis (Table 1). In a separate model, we replaced the
aPFC region with an MTL (Model V) region that was also iden-
tified in the AU analysis (Table 1). In both of these models, the
replaced region did not predict significant VS activation, while
the effects associated with the nonreplaced region remained un-
changed (Model IV, aPFCbyAuC, t(651)2.78, p 0.01; aPFC
by IR, t(651)2.50, p 0.05; LOT-related effects, all t 1.00,
all p 0.32;Model V, vmPFC, t(651) 6.11, p 0.001; vmPFCby
IR, t(651) 3.62, p 0.001; MTL-related effects, all t 1.38, all
p 0.17). These control results suggest that the significant effects
observed in the original model were not attributable to using an
averaged value for the trial epoch, or to the high degrees of free-
dom present in the model, but instead were specifically related to
Table 2. Statistical values of predicting effects modeled inmixed effect GLM analysis
All trial periods Choice period Delay period
Effect df t value p value df t value p value df t value p value
aPFC 651 0.86 0.40 651 0.35 0.72 656 0.30 0.77
vmPFC 651 5.87 0.0000*** 651 4.52 0.0000*** 656 4.40 0.0000***
AuC 41 0.82 0.42 41 1.99 0.05* 41 2.05 0.04*
IR 651 0.13 0.90 651 0.21 0.83
aPFC AuC 651 3.80 0.0002*** 651 2.76 0.006** 656 2.86 0.004**
aPFC IR 651 2.30 0.02* 651 0.53 0.57
vmPFC IR 651 3.28 0.001** 651 1.48 0.14
AuC IR 651 1.97 0.05* 651 2.15 0.03*
aPFC IR AuC 651 1.15 0.25 651 1.21 0.23
Constant 651 2.20 0.02* 651 1.67 0.10 656 1.66 0.10
VS activation is predicted by vmPFC and aPFC activations with delay discounting (AuC) and IR valuemodulations. Separate models were tested for the full-trial, choice, and delay periods. For the delay periodmodel, IR-related effects were
not included because their potential impact on decision value should occur only during the choice period.
*p 0.05; **p 0.01; ***p 0.001.
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the trial-by-trial and between-subject variability in aPFC and
vmPFC activation. Last, in this second set of control models
(Models IV and V), AIC and BICwere again greater than those in
the original model (Model IV, AIC, 1912; BIC, 1989; Model V,
AIC, 2010; BIC, 2087), confirming that the combination of
vmPFC, aPFC, and the AuCwas needed to explainmaximal vari-
ance in the observed data.
Discussion
The current study provides new insights regarding the core neu-
ral mechanisms of intertemporal decisionmaking by focusing on
brain activity dynamics during the postchoice delay period, in
addition to choice-related activity. Impulsivity in decision mak-
ing was associated with increased VS activation not only during
choice, but also during the delay period, while waiting for the
chosen future reward. In contrast, patient individuals exhibited
increased aPFC activity both during choice and also during the
early periods of waiting. Last, the time-discounted subjective
value of delayed rewards corresponded with a pattern of vmPFC
activity that dynamically tracked the time to reward delivery.
These three brain regions were also found to show a particular
pattern of functional connectivity, in which VS activity was pos-
itively influenced by vmPFC input, but negatively by aPFC, with
the nature of this influence further dependent on trial-by-trial
(immediate reward value) and individual difference (delay-
discounting rate) factors. Importantly, these effects were ob-
served not just during the delay period, but also during choice,
suggesting functional continuity in the role of these regions in
value representation. Together, the findings provide support
for the idea that intertemporal decision making involves
complementary neural mechanisms in the vmPFC, VS, and
aPFC.
Many previous investigations have suggested key roles for
vmPFC and VS in valuation-related processes (Montague and
Berns, 2002; O’Doherty, 2004; Kim et al., 2008; Rangel et al.,
2008; Hare et al., 2009; Jocham et al., 2011), which are corrobo-
rated but also extended here. Replicating previous findings, both
of these regions were sensitive to changes in reward value during
the choice phase of decisionmaking, exhibiting greater activation
on trials inwhich the value of the immediate (or total) rewardwas
increased. The data are thus consistent with standard accounts of
goal value representations, in which the subjective value of re-
wards is represented in a “common currency” code that can be
accessed on the basis of predictive cues (Montague and Berns,
2002; Rangel et al., 2008; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010a; Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011). Critically, however, the results provide novel
support for the idea that such value representations are not just
Figure 6. Path diagram indicating the functional connectivity relationships between VS, vmPFC, and aPFC. All within- and between-subject effects were estimated in a multilevel mixed-effect
GLM model. The numbers besides the paths indicate parameter estimates and their SEM in parenthesis (from the full-trial model). The vmPFC inputs (solid line) have a positive influence on VS
activation, with the effects further amplified by IR value (stronger influences on high IR trials). Conversely, the aPFC inputs (dashed line) have a negative influence on VS activation, with the effects
also amplified by IR value, and further individual differences in delay discounting rate (stronger influences for high AuC individuals). *p 0.05; **p 0.01; ***p 0.001.
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available at the time of choice, but also dynamically increase dur-
ing the interval while waiting for that reward, peaking at the time
of reward delivery. This pattern, though previously predicted by
neuroeconomic models (Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Mon-
tague and Berns 2002; Berns et al., 2006), provides the first direct
evidence in humans that subjective reward value is coded in a
time-discounted and continuously evolving manner.
The findings also support and extend previous research indi-
cating a link between VS activation and behavioral impulsivity,
both in terms of intertemporal decision making (Tanaka et al.,
2004; Hariri et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Ballard and
Knutson, 2009; Pine et al., 2009) and other trait markers (Dalley
et al., 2007; Forbes et al., 2009; Buckholtz et al., 2010). Consistent
with this previous research, we found that impulsive individuals
(indexed by steep discounting), exhibited greater VS activation
during intertemporal choice, particularly on trials in which the
immediate reward had high relative subjective value. This pattern
suggests that impulsive individuals weremore sensitive to imme-
diate reward value. Yet an additional, novel finding of our study
was that these individuals also exhibited a differential pattern of
VS activation dynamics (i.e., more sharply accelerated) during
the postchoice period. This pattern would be expected if impul-
sive individuals more steeply discounted the subjective value of
the chosen delayed reward at the time when it was selected.
A novel contribution of the current study is the finding that
ventral aPFC regions may encode an anticipatory utility signal
associated with delayed rewards, that is, the extra utility derived
from the pleasure of waiting for a reward delivered in the future
(Loewenstein, 1987; Berns et al., 2006, 2007). Previous economic
models have postulated a role for anticipatory utility in intertem-
poral choice, but this is the first demonstration that such utility
has a direct neural correlate during human reward-based deci-
sion making. Support for the role of aPFC in anticipatory utility
was demonstrated not only in terms of the characteristic pattern
of delay-related activation dynamics, but also in the finding that
this signal was stronger inmore patient individuals. Importantly,
the increased aPFC activity was associated with reduced VS activ-
ity observed in such individuals, suggesting functional connec-
tivity between aPFC and VS during intertemporal choice
behavior. Interestingly, this finding is consistent with previous
work demonstrating negative functional connectivity from this
same ventral aPFC region to VS, with connectivity strength pre-
dicting both behavioral success at resisting impulsive choices and
reduced trait impulsivity (Diekhof and Gruber, 2010).
The localization of an anticipatory utility signal within aPFC is
consistent with previous work and theoretical accounts of aPFC
function. In particular, there is a growing consensus that anterior
regions of PFC play a critical role in the process of episodic
prospection, that is, consideration of future outcomes (Koechlin
and Hyafil, 2007; Glimcher, 2009; Benoit et al., 2011; Roesch et
al., 2012). Lateral aPFC regions are reliably engaged by prospec-
tive memory (Reynolds et al., 2009; Burgess et al., 2011) (i.e.,
maintenance of intentions to be carried out in the future), while
medial/polar regions are engaged by episodic future thought
(Schacter et al., 2007; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010b; Benoit et al.,
2011) (i.e., mental time travel). These processes are thought to be
a major component of planning, imagination, and affective fore-
casting (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007). Anterior PFC may thus en-
able the internal representation of anticipated future stateswithin
working memory (Shamosh et al., 2008), such that these can be
evaluated to bias action selection (cf., Braver et al., 2003; Sakai
and Passingham 2006; Jimura and Braver, 2010). To speculate,
this aPFC effect on decision making could occur not only in the
current trial, but also in later trials, as delay-period aPFC activity
may leave some kind of trace, either in terms of persistent activity
or plasticity, whichmay influence subsequent decisions.Our data
suggest that the current aPFC region, located at the intersection
of medial and lateral sectors, might enable mental simulation of
future states expected from delivery of an upcoming reward.
Thus, a plausible interpretation of the aPFC findings is that, in
patient individuals, the current utility experienced from antici-
pation of a future reward matched well with the current estimate
of subjective value of the reward while waiting for it (Loewen-
stein, 1987; Berns et al., 2007). In other words, individuals show-
ing delay-related aPFC activity may have experienced greater
anticipatory utility during the delay period (i.e., stronger hedonic
benefits conferred by the act of waiting) (cf., Kahneman et al.,
1997). Nevertheless, additional evidence would be needed to di-
rectly support this putative functional role of delay-related aPFC
activation.Moreover, as the current study did not examine causal
relations between decision- and delay-related effects, it is still
unclear whether the delay-period activations influence the deci-
sion per se. Such evidence could be obtained through delay-of-
gratification paradigms (Mischel et al., 1989) in which
participants have an opportunity to “defect” to an immediate
reward after making an initial choice to wait. Alternatively, pertur-
bation studies (e.g., with transcranial magnetic stimulation; cf.
Figner et al., 2010) would be useful for demonstrating that delay-
related aPFC activity (or its disruption) alters choice preferences
toward immediate rewards. Finally, it is possible that aPFC
signals of anticipatory utility could be examined equally well,
or even more sensitively, with conventional delay-discounting
paradigms that focus more intensively on choice-period ef-
fects using abstract (e.g., monetary) rewards delivered at lon-
ger time scales in the future.
At a minimum, the characteristic pattern of activation dy-
namics and individual differences observed during the pos-
tchoice delay period in both aPFC and VS indicate unique and
dissociable neural signatures in these two regions that are linked
to individual differences in impulsivity and self-control. Al-
though further work is certainly needed, the current study clearly
highlights the utility and productivity of experimental ap-
proaches to decision making that shift focus toward the previ-
ously neglected temporal window between choices and their
subsequent outcomes.
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